Blog Archives
Mitt Romney’s foreign policy flaws
Our President’s latest essay on Mitt Romney’s Foreign Policy, its flaws and potential setbacks in the MENA Region can be consulted at the following address:
Magazine version of the article
The full article: Mitt Romney’s Foreign Policy Flaws
hesitant to trust us”[4]. Affirming that American weakness is the true motivator of the anti-American tensions unfolding in the Middle East is a narrow appreciation for the politics shaping the Middle Eastern mindset. The tense relations with the Afghan and Pakistani population are not the result of lack of military personnel in the region but the direct outcome of inconsiderate usage of drone attacks on terrorist targets and civilian gatherings. The defiance of China is not the upshot of lack of naval military units in the pacific but the consequence of economic leverage of the Chinese industry. As Obama pointed it out during the last presidential debate when addressing Romney’s call for increased budgetary allowances to the Pentagon, “You mentioned the Navy, for example, and that we have fewer ships than we did in 1916. Well, Governor, we also have fewer horses and bayonets, because the nature of our military’s changed.” Romney has to redraft the foreign policy of the US not along military quantitative intensification but through diplomatic active performance throughout the Globe in order to achieve what cannot be done through military might. Military intervention in Iran will have devastating effects with only an ephemeral gain to delay Iranian nuclear ambitions, yet active collaboration with world players can coordinate effective economic sanctions that can and are already crippling Iranian financial sector. Todays’ world, today’s distribution of power and today’s multinational ambitions for influence and control render the Reaganesque peace-through-strength obsolete and irrelevant to the dynamics of world affairs. The winner takes it all strategy that Romney intends on pursuing is not realistic given the existence of governments and third parties that are powerful enough to claim their share of the global cake.
Post-Revolutionary Egypt: What’s Next?
Now the full document can be consulted entirely in PDF format in Scribd and Issuu.
Note:
This document is the intellectual property of both Mohamed Amine Belarbi and the Arab Institute for Youth Policy Making. Any copy or redistribution of part or of the entire essay ought to include a reference to both parties. This essay is referenced as a publication of the AIYPM sourcing in its branch in Morocco, the MIYPM.
You can consult the AIYPM blog on the following address: www. aiypm.co.cc
Full Document:
Why a war on Iran profits everyone
Whether in the stormy streets of Lebanon or behind the closed doors of the Mossad, words and words again have been spilled on Iran’s nuclear program, and most importantly on an imminent attack on Khomeini’s’ stronghold as a pre-emptive option to avoid the emergence of a nuclear mushroom over Tel Aviv. The controversy is fierce, and the implications are far reaching both regionally and internationally. Taking the decision to fire a couple of Tomahawks over Natanz facility or wiping out the Bushehr nuclear reactor is easy for some officials in the Knesset, but the real nature of such decision is no different than the ‘halted’ decision to fire nukes on Havana at the time of the Kennedy administration in the 60s. Only difference: this time we don’t have brilliant decision makers of Kennedy’s caliber.
In this article, I will not spend chapters elaborating on the chaos an attack on Iran would engender, but rather I wish to draw a positive picture of what everyone has to gain from a military action against the Islamic Republic.
First focal point I’ll build on is ultimately related to another tragedy ongoing right now, a tragedy which victims amount to more than 10 000 and whose audience overpassed the 6 billion viewers. Lots of troubles yet no one is making bald moves, all what is being actively used are expired excuses copied from the encyclopedia RealPolitika at the detriment of the civilians massacred in AlHoula, Edlib and Dir Ezzour by the Assad mercenaries.
What have we to gain from a potential attack on Iran in regards to the Syrian Crisis? An individual with decent understanding of world alliances and regional features of the Middle East can pinpoint to the answer: An inevitable fall of the regime in Syria, and a long awaited victory of the Syrian revolution!
Well, what if I’m not that knowledgeable in world politics and international relations; could you enlighten me Mr. Belarbi on how an attack on Iran could speed up the collapse of the Assad regime? Sure. A key ally to the regime in Syria is, as most of us know, Iran whose unconditional support to the Allaouite center of power made it possible for Assad to survive so far the revolution, along of course with the strategic back up of Moscow and Beijing.
Teheran has been indulging in tremendous efforts to secure logistical and military support to the Syrian regime, let alone a fierce supply of advisors and defense strategists summoned by the Ayatollah and either flown or put on the line with Assad security chiefs and police. Giving lessons on ‘how to end dissidence and shut down rebellion’ is nothing new for Teheran, and sharing this invaluable knowledge with a key partner in the region is no more than a duty friends owe to each other. This is far from being the product of speculations and hypothetical scenarios as the UN and several western powers have condemned the shipping of arms and weapons from Iran and Russia to Syria over the past months, weapons which this time are not conventional missiles and rifles, but gear specially used by police forces to storm demonstrations and fight dissidents and rebels.
This being said, a potential military action in Iran could divert the Khomeini administration from Syria, and instead give it enough troubles to focus solely on the internal crisis and divert its entire logistical and military arsenal to fight back the Zionist coordinated assault on the nation. The Assad regime deprived from the flow of weapons coming from Persia, it will be impossible to sustain the level of operations against the rebels, giving thus the revolution the opportunity to revitalize across the country.
But Mr. Belarbi, if the Syrian regime doesn’t get weapons from Iran, they could just as well turn to someone else; they got a couple of friends ready to send in supplies and ammunitions, don’t they?
Well indeed, Syria has several key allies, but the business Syria does with Iran is different in nature from the one it could conduct with Russia and China. Syria was not in need of cash in order to receive weapons from Iran as the incentive of Khomeini and Ahmadi Nejad was both sectarian and political, yet when it is business with Moscow, the primary currency is money, not good will, and that’s something Bashar Al Assad doesn’t have at the moment given the fact that the country doesn’t have fountains of oil to lean on nor operating industries to finance its purchases with. As Farid Zakaria repeated once and again, Assad is running out of cash!
The other good news for Syrian rebels in case an attack is undertook against Iran is that the F-16 and drones used in an attack on Teheran could just as well gather intelligence data on Assad troops and then send the intel to the rebels who could operate more efficiently against the regimes’ squads. The air force deployed against Iran nuclear facilities and the ground troops sent on the ground if the conflict escalates will be of great resource to the revolutionaries, both supplying them with weapons and with intelligence reports. The story then would advance as it did in Libya: as the locations of Assad troops becomes easy, and as the Qatari weapons are supplied to the rebels by the ground troops operating in Iran, the days of the Syrian regime would be numbered, and the victory certain for the Syrian opposition. Voilà!